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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 82

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 19/07/1997

Where it occurred: Kariz Mir Village,
Shakar Dara District,
Kabul

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
hard
residential/urban

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)
victim squatting and stepped on mine (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
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inadequate equipment (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for two years. He had last attended a revision course two
months before and last been on leave 35 days before. The ground where the accident
occurred was described as a residential area that was "bushy" and medium hard.
The investigators determined that the victim had checked the area with a detector then
started to cut the grass and bush with a sickle. He stepped on a mine that he has missed at
the end of his work on the previous day. The investigation was limited by bad security in the
area and the investigators were unable to validate a claim that the Schiebel detector signalled
constantly and so was unreliable.
The Section Leader said the victim was careless because he was squatting to cut bushes
when the accident occurred. Previously he had found a continuous reading and should have
cleared the area from one side, then checked that the reading had gone before moving
forward.
The victim's partner stated that the accident occurred when the victim was squatting to cut
bushes and stepped on a mine he had missed the day before. He suggested an alternative to
cutting bushes by sickle would make the job safer.
Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim worked too quickly at the end of the previous day
and missed the mine, also that he had marked an area greater than that actually cleared.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that all deminers should avoid working too quickly and carry
out proper prodding and marking procedures. They added that deminers should "ensure
50cm safety margin" when marking the end of a cleared lane, that the command group should
pay extra attention to deminers removing obstacles and should also make quality control
checks in each lane daily to ensure that no detector readings are left. Finally, they
recommended that, Section Leaders should check their men closely, especially those who
"may be weak or careless in their duties".

Victim Report
Victim number: 113

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%)

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor
Summary of injuries:
severe Genitals
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severe Hands
severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
FATAL
COMMENT
Victim died five days after the accident. See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as: "left leg amputated and received fatal injuries on
his thigh;" traumatic amputation of left leg under knee, serious injury to left thigh, serious
injury to testes; injuries to both hands: died on 24th July.
A sketch showing extensive injury is reproduced below.

The demining group reported that the victim had suffered a below knee amputation of his left
leg, a fracture of his left femur, lacerated wounds to his left gluteal region, left thigh, groin and
multiple superficial injuries on both arms. The victim died five days later in Kabul hospital.
The cause of death was given as "respiratory arrest due to septicaemia and renal failure".
Compensation of 500,000 Rs was forwarded on 4th December 1997.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
had either been working inadequately on the previous day and his error was not corrected, or
he was working inadequately when the accident occurred.
The provision of a "sickle" to cut all vegetation including the tough, fibrous Afghan bush may
be seen as a management failing because the selection of tools issued was determined by
senior programme managers. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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